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Abstract: This paper shows that the assumed distribution of earning abilities (wages) plays an 
important role in determining the optimal shape of non-linear income tax schedule. We replace the 
assumption of lognormal distribution used in several papers by the Champernowne distribution. 
Using numerical simulations we show that the U-shaped pattern of the marginal income tax rates can 
be obtained without assuming constant labour supply elasticity as in Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001). 
Our numerical results also suggest that it is either a sufficiently high inherent inequality or a 
combination of sufficiently high inherent inequality and sufficiently low revenue requirement that 
leads to a pattern of optimally increasing marginal tax rates. Furthermore, the paper also shows that the   
revenue requirement has a central role in determining the extent of redistribution and the level of the 
guaranteed minimum income. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Optimal income tax schedules have been calculated under various assumptions. In simulations that 
followed Mirrlees (1971), the optimal income tax schedule typically exhibits an inverted U-shape. 
Results also turn out to be rather sensitive to particular assumptions.  One of the key factors 
explaining the shape of optimal non-linear income tax schedule is the shape of the wage distribution 
among workers. As noted by Diamond (1998, page 93); “Presumably the relatively constant 
marginal tax rate in those simulations (Mirrlees,1971) would have had a different shape with a 
different assumed family of distributions”. One of our aim in this paper is just to explore how 
sensitive the shape of the non-linear tax schedule is to the chosen distribution. 
 
There are, however, studies  indicating that results can change significantly if either a larger 
standard deviation is assumed , or if the distribution of wages  is Pareto rather than lognormal.  
Kanbur-Tuomala (1994) retain the assumption of a log-normal distribution, but simulate cases in 
which the standard deviation is greater than in earlier calculations. They show that increases in 
wage inequality can alter the qualitative pattern of optimal marginal tax rates. The optimal 
graduation can indeed be such that marginal tax rates increase for the majority of the population, 
but there continues to exist a significant income range at the top where marginal tax rates decline.  
Diamond (1998) in turn presents evidence that the wage distribution assumed can affect the shape 
of the optimal income tax schedule. He shows that if preferences are quasi-linear in consumption, 
an explicit formula for the marginal tax rate can be derived in terms of  the distribution of wages, 
the elasticity of labour supply and the social welfare function1. For this case, he finds that above 
some critical wage level, the pattern of marginal rates is U-shaped if the elasticity of labour supply 
is constant, the density of wages is single peaked and wages follows the Pareto distribution above 
the modal wage2. Boadway et al (2000) conduct a similar analysis for the quasi-linear preferences in 
leisure.  Saez (2001) in a more general treatment, using an elasticity approach, showed that the 
optimal income tax schedule would be U-shaped. As Diamond (1998)  Saez (2001) assumes that the 
elasticity of labour supply is constant at all productivity levels. He simulates on US data a marginal 
tax rate schedule that slopes upwards at around fairly high income level.  
                                                 
1 See also Atkinson (1990,1995). 
2  Dahan-Strawczynski (2000) show, however, that a rising marginal tax rates at high incomes presented by Diamond 
(1998) depend on the assumption of utility of consumption. Their simulations focus only on high levels of income, not 
the whole schedule. 
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Because one of the key factors explaining the shape of an optimal income tax schedule is the 
assumed family of distributions of earning abilities, it is an interest to look at other distributions 
than the lognormal and the Pareto distribution. As in Bevan (2005) we replace the lognormal 
distribution by the Champernowne distribution3.  As commonly known the lognormal distribution 
fits reasonable well over a large part of income range but diverges markedly at the both tails. The 
Pareto distribution in turn fits well at the upper tail. Champernowne (1952) proposes a model in 
which individual incomes were assumed to follow a random walk in the logarithmic scale. Here we 
use the two parameter version of the Champernowne distribution. This distribution approaches 
asymptotically a form of Pareto distribution for large values of wages but it also has an interior 
maximum (see Figure 1).   
 
In principle, the revenue requirement will affect the shape of the optimal tax schedule. There are very 
few analytical results (if any) in this area. The previous  numerical calculations  suggest that within a 
range of -10% of GDP to 10% of GDP the revenue requirement has just no effect on the shape of the 
marginal tax rate schedule, except for raising or lowering of the whole schedule  (see Tuomala, 1984 
and 1990).  While going outside the range, at least in negative direction, is perhaps implausible in the 
context of the national economy, when redistributing between groups within an economy this is no 
longer the case. For example, the subsidy given to pensioners as group (as a fraction of their pre-
transfer income) is probably quite high.   Immonen et al (1999) show that in some cases it is optimal 
to transfer 50% or even 100% of pre-transfer group income to a group. They find that in these cases 
the optimal within group tax schedule shows increasing marginal tax rates. On the other hand in the 
previous numerical calculations revenue requirement has been implausible low. Therefore in this 
paper we study numerically how the higher revenue requirement will affect the shape of the tax 
schedule.   
 
Other questions we explore in this paper are how sensitive is the shape of tax schedule to the 
interaction between the family of distributions of wages assumed and the utility function, how 
sensitive is the level of the lump sum transfer component of the tax system to the specification of 
the model, and what is the relationship between the lump sum transfer and the progressivity of tax 
schedule. 
                                                 
3 It is often (also in an earlier version of this paper) referred to as the Fisk distribution (see Fisk, 1961a,b). 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of the original Mirrlees 
model and highlights the role of the underlying factors in determining the pattern of marginal tax 
rates. Section 3 outlines numerical solution and presents optimal asymptotic rates for a specific 
example. Section 4 provides numerical simulations with different specifications of the model and 
section 5 concludes.  
    
 
2. The Mirrlees model 
 
There is a continuum of individuals, each having the same preference ordering, which is represented by 
an additive utility function u  defined over consumption x and hours worked y, with U)()( yVxU −= x > 
0 and Vy < 0 (subscripts indicating partial derivatives) and where V(.)  is convex. Individuals differ only 
in the pre-tax wage n they can earn. There is a distribution of n on the interval (l,h) represented by the 
density function f(n).Earnings are equal  z = ny.          
                                                                   
  Suppose that the aim of policy can be expressed as maximizing the following social welfare criterion 
         ,                                                                                               (1) ∫= h
l
dnnfnuWS )())((
where W(.) is an increasing and concave function of utility. The government cannot observe individuals’ 
productivities, only the distribution f(n), and thus is restricted to setting taxes and transfers as a function 
only of earnings, T . The government maximizes S subject to the revenue constraint ))(( nz
 
                                                                                                           (2) ∫ =
h
l
RdnnfnzT )())((
 
where R is the required revenue for essential public goods. In addition to the revenue constraint, the 
government faces incentive compatibility constraints. These in turn state that each n individual 
maximizes utility by choice of hour.           
        
 Totally differentiating utility with respect to n , and making use of workers utility maximization 
condition, we obtain the incentive compatibility constraints, 
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Since T , we can think of government as choosing schedules  and . In fact it is easier 
to think of it choosing a pair of functions, and , which maximize welfare index (1) subject to 
the incentive compatibility condition (3) and the revenue requirement  (2). The first order conditions of 
this problem with respect to   gives 
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where  , λ is the multiplier on the revenue constraint  and  )( yyyy yVVg +=−
                             .)()/1)('(()( dppfUUWn
n
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is the multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint. This latter satisfies the transversality 
conditions  
                             0)()( == hl µµ .                                                                                      (6). 
 
 
It is useful to rewrite marginal rates6  in terms of traditional labour supply elasticities. Now we can 
write marginal rates, )(')( zTz =τ  ; 
                                                 
    4 The first order condition of individual’s optimisation problem is only a necessary condition for the individual's 
choice to be optimal, but we assume here that it is sufficient as well. Assumptions that assure sufficiency are provided by 
Mirrlees (1976). Note also that while we here presume an internal solution for y, (3) remains valid even if individuals 
were bunched at y=0 since, for them, du/dn=0. 
5 Integrating the first order condition of the problem with respect to u and using the transversality condition (6) we have 
(5). 
6  See also Revesz (1989), Roberts (2000) and Saez (2001). Using formulas for uE  (=uncompensated wage elasticity) 
and cE   (=compensated wage elasticity) we can show that  cu
y
y EE
V
g
/)1( +=− . 
Differentiating the FOC  of the individual maximization, 0)1( =+− yx VnU τ ,  with respect to net wage, labour 
supply and virtual income, ,  we have after some manipulation elasticity formulas; b
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To get a better idea of the shape of the marginal tax rate schedule, following Atkinson (1995) and 
Diamond (1998), we multiply and divide (5) by ( ))(1 nF−  to obtain: 
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The formula (8) is rather complicated. It does however provide several insights. There are four 
elements on the right hand side of (8)  that determine optimum marginal tax rates.  
 
(1)  First, the term on the right hand side of (8),  , expressing labour supply responses in 
uncompensated and compensated elasticities, represents the standard efficiency effect, reflecting also 
conventional wisdom. It says that, other things equal, the marginal tax rate  is decreasing  in 
nA
cE  and uE . 
It is also important to note that, for a given compensated elasticity cE  , the decomposition into 
uncompensated and income effects matters. The higher are income effects ( in absolute terms) relative to 
uncompensated effect, the higher is the marginal tax rate. What is also important here is that  the 
elasticity may vary across population. This means that we need to know how the elasticity varies with the 
wage rate.  
 
(2) The second term, , tells that the shape of the wage distribution affects the optimal marginal tax 
rate at the wage level n through the ratio 
nB
)(
)(1
nnf
nF− ( known as the inverse hazard ratio). When we 
increase the marginal tax rate at some n, we collect more revenue on more productive individuals, who 
are 1  in number.  In other words an increase in marginal rate depends on the proportion of the 
population above n. The purpose of higher marginal rate is to increase the average tax rate higher up the 
)(nF−
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scale. Hence 1 is in the numerator. And we distort only the behaviour of the marginal type, which 
explains why  in turn is in the denominator. 
)(nF−
)(nf
The marginal tax rate is higher when n is lower in the distribution (
n
nF )(1−  is decreasing in n ) and 
when nf(n), an indicator of the extent of earnings  at the wage level n, is smaller. Hence, raising 
marginal rates on very low incomes, say z*, raise substantial revenue because most of the taxpayers 
has income higher than this level. Moreover, higher marginal rates at the bottom are inframarginal for 
this large group. The high marginal rates act as a lump sum tax on higher earnings. Secondly, in the 
denominator f is not very large and n in turn is low, so there is little lost revenue. These 
considerations explain why several simulations produce high marginal rates at the bottom of the 
distribution. It has to remember that our story above is based on ceteris paribus assumption. 
Equation (8) also suggests that, other things equal, the marginal tax rate should be lower the denser 
the population at that point, i.e. higher . In other words the larger the fraction of the taxpayers 
paying more tax and the smaller is the group being distorted. On the other hand for the typical 
distribution the density weighted by  is likely to decline with n above some point suggesting a 
higher marginal tax rate on high earners. Figure 2 shows this for the lognormal and the 
Champernowne distribution.(The ranking of the distributions in Figures 1 and 2: The lognormal 
distribution has the highest peak, then the Campernowne distribution with θ=4 (a shape or Pareto 
parameter), and the lowest peak with θ =2) 
)(nf
n
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Figure 1: fc  (Champernowne distribution) and fl (lognormal distribution) 
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 Figure 2  nfc  (Champernowne distribution) and nfl (lognormal distribution) 
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In the case of lognormal distribution, then the ratio falls with n, tending in the limit to zero as n tends 
to infinity. In the case of the Champernowne distribution this ratio in turn tends to constant as n 
increases .The upper part of the Champernowne distribution follows the Pareto distribution, 
)(
)(1
nnf
nF−   
is constant and  is equal to 1/θ.  Figure 3 shows this effect for different distributions (exponential, 
lognormal and Champernowne distribution),  
 
Figure 3: fc  (Champernowne distribution), fe (exponential distribution), fl (lognormal distribution) 
 
 
 
 
         
 
(3) The third term,C ,reflects income effects and (4) the fourth term , ,  in turn incorporates 
distributional concerns. In the fourth term, the integral term
n nD
)(nµ  measures the social welfare gain 
from slightly increasing the marginal tax rate at n and distributing as a poll subsidy to those below n 
the revenue raised from the consequent increase in average tax rates above . From the 
transversality conditions we can deduce that 
n
)(nµ   increases with  n  for low  n  (their social utility 
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of income, W xU' ,  exceeds the marginal social cost of public funds, λ,) and decreases with   for 
high n . The turning point depends on λ
n
7. The lower is λ, the higher is the n at which the turning 
point occurs. Thus as the revenue requirement falls, and hence λ falls, the range over which )(nµ   
is increasing stretches further. It can be shown that W is decreasing in n* (n* is the skill level at 
which 
xU'
  λ=*))(*),((' nynxU x
)(n
*))(( nuW ) so long as W  is concave and leisure is normal ( see 
proof in appendix A). 
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Since  affects the marginal tax rate positively, this means that the range over which the latter 
increases also stretches further - at least for this reason. In this sense, therefore, more tax revenue 
leads to a less progressive tax structure. The intuition, put crudely, is that the lower is the revenue 
requirement, the more the government can afford to support the poor by a generous poll subsidy, 
recouping at least part of this by a pattern of rising marginal tax rates on the better off. 
 
As should be obvious from the above discussion, the exact pattern of this term in (8) follows as n rises 
depends on the social welfare function and the shape of the wage distribution. So the shape of the wage 
distribution is also important here. Moreover it is obvious in the integral term in (8) that the functional 
form of  U  has the important role in determining the shape of the schedule.  
 
3. Numerical solution  
 
   Following Mirrlees (1971) we define 
 
    v ,                                                                                                              (9) =
 
    and rewrite (4) 
 
.2− n                                                                    (10)                
7 Note λ is itself a function of the overall distribution, since from (6)    (the social welfare 
function is utilitarian, i.e. W’=1) 
∫=
h
l
x dppfU ))()/1(/(1λ
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Differentiating (10) with respect to n and we have 
      
 )1'(1)'2(' 2
xU
W
nf
nf
n
vv −++−= λ                                                                                (11) 
 
 (11) and (3), two differential equations in u and v, provide the solution to the optimal income tax 
problem, together with the condition 
  
                                                                         (12)          ∫ −=
n
l
x dnnfUWfvn )())/1()/'((
2 λ
and 
at n=no8;                                                   (13) ∫ −= 0 )())/1()/'(()(2
n
l
xooo dnnfUWvnfn λ
and   the transversality condition 0)( =hµ    and (12) require that                                                 
  
)(02 ∞→→ nfvnλ   .                                                                                                  (14) 
 
The condition (14) guarantees an accurate value for no .                                                                                            
 
Before going to numerical results we analyze asymptotic marginal tax rates in the following case: 
 
(i)  The Champernowne distribution 
 
There are a number of mathematical distribution functions extensively used in describing wage 
distributions such as lognormal, Pareto and Gamma. Empirical evidence is not conclusive about the 
quality of each in fitting actual distributions. Specifically, Pareto distributions are found to fit 
reasonable well at the upper tail of distributions, but the fit over the whole range of income turns 
out to be quite poor. As for the other functions such as lognormal and Gamma, while providing a 
good fit over a large part of the income range, they markedly differ at the upper tail. The 
explanation for this different performance seems to be that these functions are defined so as to reach 
a maximum  in the interior of the interval definition, thereby giving a better fit over the values 
                                                 
8 no, largest n for which y(n)=0, may be in some cases rather large. In the interval [0, no], y=0 and x=x0 and then   
u=U(xo)-V(0) (*). (*) and (13) are needed for starting values in numerical solutions of (11) and (3) conditional on a trial 
value for no. 
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around the mode. However these functions have the drawback that their elasticity increases 
unboundly after the mode has been attained, thus contradicting the large evidence of a constant 
elasticity at the upper tail , which is precisely what characterizes Pareto distribution.  To avoid this 
we adopt the Champernowne distribution. Here we use the two parameter version of the 
Champernowne distribution. The parameter µ is the median value and θ is a constant corresponding 
to Pareto’s constant for high incomes. The Champernowne distribution approaches asymptotically a 
form of Pareto distribution for large values of n, but it also has an interior maximum.  As the 
lognormal the Champernowne distribution exhibits the following features: asymmetry, a left 
humpback and long right-hand  tail. It has a thicker upper tail than in the lognormal case.  
  
The probability density function of the Champernowne distribution 
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n
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in which   θ  is a shape parameter and µ is  a scale parameter. The cumulative distribution function 
is 
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 For the inverse hazard rate 
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and in the elasticity form 
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or 
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(ii)   The utility function is )1log(log yxu −+= . 
 
To find asymptotic marginal tax rates we write s=1-y and put t=logn.  Now we can write 
 
)(
n
xssv −= . We use a constant absolute utility-inequality aversion form for the social welfare 
function of the government is specified  
   (iii)                 ueuS ββ
−−= 1)(                                                                                     (21) 
where β  measures the degree of inequality aversion in the social welfare function of the government 
(in the case of 0=β  , we define W ).   u=
Now if f(n) is the Champernowne distribution, then (11) becomes 
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Since 
θ−−=∞→ 1'lim f
nf
n . i.e as in  Pareto distribution 
 
and 
 
θ+−=→ 1'lim 0 f
nf
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Hence from (3) 
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Using (24) we can write 
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Denote τ=2s
v  i.e the marginal tax rate 
 
It follows that 
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For 0=
dt
dτ , it has to be 
s)1(
1
θτ +=  and for  0=dt
ds  in turn θτ += 1
2 . 
As , ∞→n θτ +→ 1
2 . 
 
 
If the Pareto exponent were 3, we would have an optimal tax rate  of 50 %. This is just the same 
result given by Mirrlees (1971,p.200).  
 
We can give a more fully description of the solution in the case of  the Pareto distribution.  When 
the path to the singular solution starts from s=1, this implies that   the marginal tax rates increase 
monotonically from 
)1(
1
θτ +=  to  θτ += 1
2 . It is also important to note that these results are 
independent of the form of the government ‘s maximand and of the net revenue requirement. 
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5. Results of numerical simulations 
 
 
On the basis of the first order conditions it is possible to say relatively little about the general shape 
of the tax schedule. Therefore, following the lead of Mirrlees (1971), numerical calculations have 
proved useful in generating useful results9. We follow this route here. We assume f(n) is the 
Champernowne distribution. In our basic case a scale parameter µ is as in Mirrlees (1971) with 
lognormal distribution; e-1=.36788 and θ =3.3. 10 But the distribution of earnings is not the 
distribution of n-it is the distribution of z. Ideally we would like to use in numerical simulations 
empirical earnings distributions. This cannot apply directly because the distribution of z is affected 
by income taxation. This means that when we change utility function or its parameters, we also 
change the distribution of n so that resulting distribution of z (absent the tax) remains the same. 
Otherwise, we get an effect through the changes in utility functions, but also through a change in 
the distribution of z.  To check this in our calculations we compare the inverse hazard ratios for the 
distribution of n  (see figure 3) and the distribution of z.    The inverse hazard ratio for the 
distribution of z is 
)(
))(1(
zzh
zH−  where h(z) is the density of the distribution of z and H(z) is the 
cumulative distribution of z. Figures B1a and b in appendix B present the graphs of the ratio for 
different specifications. It turns out that the ratios in different cases do not differ much from each 
others. 
. 
The utility function has the constant elasticity of substitution form  
 
                                                                                         (28)                       [ aaa yxlxu /1)1(),( −−− −+= ]
                                                
 
where the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure ε=1/(1+a).  
 Our calculations were carried out for the following special cases of (28); 
 
 ε = 1 (log-log or Cobb-Douglas case)    
 
                                                   (case u1)                                  (29) )1log(log yxu −+=
 
9 Tuomala (1984, 1990) gives details of the computational procedure. 
10 Bevan (2005) uses θ=3.37 based on British income data (Royal Commission on the distribution of income and 
wealth, 1971)  
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and  
ε = 0.5 (a=1)  
                                 
)1(
11
yx
u −−−= .                             (case u2)                             (30) 
 
 
 
We use a constant absolute utility-inequality aversion form for the social welfare function of the  
government (21).  We present simulations for 10 == andβ . The curvature in the utility of consumption 
modifies social marginal weights  W  and makes the government preferences (implicit) more 
redistributive. Hence the overall curvature for (21) is 
xU'
β+1 . Overcoming possible philosophical 
problems we may take a view that ß is an observable variable, not a social judgment (see Kaplow 
(2004)). R=1-X/Z=1  is specified as a fraction of national income varying 
between  X/Z=1.1 and X/Z=0.8. If X/Z=1,then taxation is purely redistributive. If X/Z>1 , then we have 
outside resources available (e.g foreign aid, the state owned firms make positive profits) 
∫ ∫− dnnfnx /)()( dnn)(fnz )(
 
 The results of the simulations are summarized below in Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 4a-7b. The Tables 1 
and 2  give labour supply,  , gross income, , net income, y z x   (also x  at the point n , denoted by 0 0x  
and   at the point F 0n , denoted by )0F
u
11 and optimal average (ATR) and marginal tax rates (MTR) at 
various percentiles of the ability distribution, when X/Z=0.9 or R=0.1. Tables also provide the decile 
ratio (P90/P10) for net income and gross income. Unlike the scalar inequality measures the use of 
fractile measures such as the decile ratio allows us to consider changes in inequality at various 
different points in the distribution.  Since marginal tax rates may be a poor indication of the 
redistribution powers of an optimal tax structure we measure the extent of redistribution, denoted by 
RD, as the proportional reduction between the decile ratio for market income, z, and the decile ratio 
for disposable income, x. To relate these results to empirical labour supply studies we give the values  
of the uncompensated  elasticity,  E  and income effect parameter I. 
 
 
                                                 
11 y(n0)=0. The range of n was n0 to 1.5, at which point the integrated value of f(n) was more than 0.9999. 
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Table 1   (case u1)  
β= 0 θ=3.3 X/Z=0.9    
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Eu        I 
0.10 0.32 0.06 0.08 -35 38   0.58 -0.5 
0.50 0.43 0.16 0.15  -7 30 0.16 -0.5 
0.90 0.46 0.33 0.27   19 32 0.09 -0.5 
0.97 0.47 0.49 0.37   23 33 0.07 -0.5 
0.99 0.47 0.69 0.50   27 33 0.05 -0.5 
P90/P10  5.44 3.26     
RD(%)   40     
n0=0.08     x0=0.046 F0=0.01       
 
 
Table 2 (case u2) 
β= 0 θ=3.3 X/Z=0.9      
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Eu        I 
0.10 0.50 0.09 0.14   -50   58 0.18 -0.22 
0.50 0.55 0.20 0.19      6   52 -0.003 -0.30 
0.90 0.53 0.38 0.28    27   52 -0.09 -0.37 
0.97 0.51 0.54 0.35    33   53 -0.13 -0.41 
0.99 0.49 0.72 0.44    39   51 -0.18 -0.46 
P90/P10  4.22  2.0     
RD(%)   52.6     
n0=0.02     x0=0.1 F0=0.0      
 
 
Table 1 and Figure 4a and b show that replacing the lognormal distribution by the Champernowne 
distribution the shape of the income tax schedule differs remarkably from those computed in 
Mirrlees (1971). In the case u1 we have an U-shaped marginal tax rate structure and the marginal 
rates are rather high at the bottom of the distribution.12 The marginal tax rate curves are decreasing 
from the bottom to middle incomes (around median). The marginal tax rate curves slope upward 
                                                 
12 Bevan (2005) also computes an U-shaped pattern with the log-log utility function.  
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starting at around  the range  60-70 percentile of wage distribution and  and then rise until income 
level at the  99th percentile.  The U-shaped pattern is very close to the marginal rate structure 
commonly observed in many countries. This pattern has sometimes been referred to as a tax 
structure which sets the floor for poverty and the ceiling to riches on the egalitarian grounds. High 
marginal tax rates at lower income levels are due to the interaction between the various schemes for 
income support and income taxation at the lower end of the income scale. The U shape of tax 
schedules in Saez (2001) was a direct consequence of the U-shaped pattern of inverse hasard ratio. 
In our calculations the inverse hazard ratio is the L-shaped in all specifications considered, (see 
Figure B1a and B1b in appendix B). Hence, the shape tax schedule is determined by the interplay 
between all factors discussed in the context of formula (8). In the case u2 the marginal tax rates are 
much higher than in the case u1. (see Table 2 and Figures 5a-6b).  In this case we can also find a 
slight U-shaped marginal tax rate curve. The marginal tax rates increase however for the lowest 
percentile and then fall and above middle incomes are roughly constant and finally rise again 
although not to the height at the rates applied to lower income individuals.  In this case the marginal 
tax rate curves slope upward starting at around the range 70 – 80 percentile of the wage distribution, 
and then rise until income level at 97th percentile point. The point in which the marginal tax rate 
curve slopes upwards is much higher in Saez (2001), around 80000 dollars/year than in our cases. In 
the case u1 the elasticities are decreasing in incomes and in the case u2 the compensated elasticities 
decrease until the median income and then they remain constant.13 Our results show that it is 
possible to get an U-shaped pattern without assuming constant wage elasticity as in Diamond 
(1998) and Saez (2001).  
 
 
 
Unfortunately there is little evidence regarding the relationship between labour supply elasticities and 
wage rates. Analyzing data from an earlier labour supply study, Sadka,Garfinkel and Moreland (1982) 
computed the compensated wage elasticity for ach quintile of income distribution and find that it 
decreases as income increases. Röed and Ström (2002) (table 1 and 2) offer a review of the existing 
                                                 
13 Saez(2001,p.225) criticizes CES-specification because the income effects are unrealistically large, around -1. 
Emmanuel Saez has kindly clarified to me that his statement is not always correct and  should have been qualified to 
that income effect is around – 1 asymptotically in the case ε<1. Using (28) and denoting 
dR
dynI = , where 
 (R=the virtual income). We have Rnyx +=
)1(
1
)1( −+−= εnI . Now we see that in the case ε=1 (case u1) I=-
0.5. When ε<1, then I converges to -1 as n goes to infinity. As seen in Table 2  I =-0.46 at the 99 percentile point  of the 
n-distribution. It is very far from -1. 
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more recent evidence. They conclude that the limited evidence indicates that labour supply elasticities 
are declining with household income. High labour supply elasticities among low-wage workers is also 
confirmed by empirical evaluations of various in-work benefit schemes operating in the US,  UK and 
some other countries,  see Blundell (2000)   for a recent review. By contrast, there is empirical 
evidence on the elasticity of taxable income that higher elasticities are among high income individuals. 
See eg. Gruber-Saez (2002).    
 
As  shown in Figures 4a-7b and Figures B2a and b in appendix B for different utility functions and 
X/Z-ratios (revenue requirement), especially in the u1 case,  the marginal rate curves are clearly U-
shaped and even more with lower revenue requirement (higher X/Z). In other words with lower 
revenue requirement (higher X/Z) the tax schedule is more progressive in the sense that the range of 
rising marginal rates increases. This is just what our discussion suggested in the context of the 
marginal tax formula (8). Some intuition for this might be developed as follows. First, it may be 
useful to describe the income tax schedule so that it consists of two elements; the guaranteed 
income; an individual with no income would get the lump sum subsidy or the guaranteed 
income ( )T  is negative if the government has redistributive 
goals) and the pattern of marginal tax rates 
).0()0(0)( TzTxnx oo −==−== 0(
)(zτ . The latter element describes both how the 
guaranteed element is clawed back or taxed away and how tax burden increase with income14. 
Consider the case where revenue requirement is positive but there is high concern for the poor. In this 
case it is likely that there will be a high guaranteed income (see Table 3) but also high marginal tax 
rates on the low income people to claw back revenue. As the revenue requirement falls, and in fact as 
it becomes negative so that outside resources are available, the minimum income requirement for the 
poor can be met easily without having to claw back revenue with high marginal tax rates. Thus we 
should expect to see low marginal tax rates on the poor. 
 
                                                 
14 Mathematically; total tax burden at income z is T .    ∫+=
z
dmmTz
0
)()0()( τ
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Figure 4a 
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Figure 4b 
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Marginal tax rate curves u2,θ=3.3
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Figure 5a 
Marginal tax rate curves u2,θ=3.3
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Figure 5b 
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To see how sensitive the shape of the tax schedule is to the choice of the parameter θ in the 
Champernowne distribution we computed solutions for θ=2.0 and 2.5 in the case u2. Figures 6a and 
6b depict these cases. When θ=2.0 the marginal tax rate is increasing with income. When θ=2.5, the 
marginal tax rates increase for the lowest decile and then the marginal tax rates remain constant. In 
the case u1 (see Figure 6c ) with θ lower than 2.2 the marginal tax rate increase with income. These 
results reinforce the findings of Kanbur-Tuomala (1994) with lognormal distribution that when 
higher values of inherent inequality (here smaller θ) are used optimal marginal tax rates increase 
with the income over the majority of the population.   Unlike in Kanbur-Tuomala (1994) with 
lognormal distribution we have here - practically speaking -  a progressive marginal rate structure 
throughout.  
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Marginal tax rate curves u2, X/Z=0.9
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Figure 6b 
Marginal tax rate curves u1, X/Z=0.9
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Figure 6c 
 26
 
What happens if higher inequality aversion is to be applied. Our numerical results (Figures 7a,b) 
seem to suggest that marginal tax rates tend to increase for all taxpayers with increasing inequality 
aversion . The shape of the tax schedule seems to change in a quite similar way as with increasing 
revenue requirement. Hence a high degree of inequality is akin to a high revenue requirement.  
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Marginal tax rate curves u1, X/Z=0.9,θ=3.3
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Figure 7b 
It may also be some interest to compare the asymptotic rates to the optimal marginal tax rates.In the 
case u1 the asymptotic marginal rate must converge to θ+
2
1
, which is 46.5 % in our specification. 
At the income level of  F(n)=0.99 optimal rates are far from their asymptotic rates (see Table 1). 
This also differs from the results in Saez (2001). The optimal rates he calculated are close to their 
asymptotic rates at the income level of $200000 (up to this income level marginal tax rates increase)   
 
 
The optimum is typically characterized by a certain fraction of individuals, at the bottom end, 
choosing not to work. Given that high marginal tax rates are optimal near the bottom, the finding 
that the percentage of those choosing not work at all is rather high might be unsurprising. It turns 
out to be so that things are not that straightforward. Namely in the case u2 (see Table 2) we have the 
highest marginal tax rates near the bottom, but the percentage of those choosing not to work is 
smaller than in other cases calculated.  
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We also explore how sensitive is the level of the guaranteed income or lump sum transfer 
component of the tax system to the specification of the model. And what is the relationship between 
the lump sum transfer and the progressivity of tax schedule. As we see from Table 2 and Figure 6 in 
the case u2 the marginal tax rates are much higher than in other cases considered and the guaranteed 
income xo is also much higher and rather substantial compared with other cases. The table 3 
displays the ratio of the guaranteed income to the average gross income with different utility 
functions and revenue requirement, X/Z. This ratio is clearly higher in the u2 case than other cases.  
Also in this case the extent of redistribution in terms of our measure RD is much larger (50.5%) 
than in other cases. 
 
Table 3.   The ratio of the guaranteed income to the average gross income  
 
X/Z u1 u2 
1.1 0.40 0.60 
1.0 0.32 0.53 
0.9 0.24 0.46 
0.8 0.19 0.39 
0.7 0.13 0.35 
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5. Conclusions 
 
 
This paper shows that the assumed distribution of wages plays an important role in determining the 
optimal shape of non-linear income tax schedule. We replace the assumption of lognormal 
distribution used in several papers by the Champernowne distribution. Using numerical simulations 
we show that the U-shaped pattern of the marginal income tax rates can be obtained without assuming 
constant labour supply elasticity as in Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001). This paper also shows 
numerically that either a sufficiently high inherent inequality or a combination of sufficiently high 
inherent inequality and sufficiently low revenue requirement that leads to a pattern of optimally 
increasing marginal tax rates. Furthermore, it is also showed the central role of the revenue requirement 
in determining the shape of the schedule, the extent of redistribution and the level of the guaranteed 
minimum income. 
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Appendix A 
 
),(*))((' yxunuW x  is decreasing in n* 
 
Proof: We prove this in case of a general utility function u=u(x,y). 
Differentiating W we have ),(*))((' yxunu x
 
)''('''' yuxuWuuW xyxxx ++     (A1) 
 
So long as W is concave the first term of (A1) is negative. Hence it suffices to show 
that 0)''( <+= yuxu xyxxψ  
Since , we have ))(()()( nnyTnnynx −=
)')(1(' ynyx +−= τ  
 
so that )'))1(()1(( yunuyu xyxxxx +−+−= ττψ  
 
Using the first order conditions of individual’s utility maximization we have 
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Define  leisure nd yl −= 1  a )1,(),( lxulx −=ς . So yl u−=ς  and yxlx u−=ς . 
Now 
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if leisure is normal. 
Above we assume that y>0. For those n for which 0)( =ny , W  is constant. xu'
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Appendix B 
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Figure B1b 
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Figure B2a 
Marginal tax rate curves u1
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Figure B2b 
Marginal tax rate curves u2
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Figure B3a 
Average tax rate curves u1
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Figure B3b 
Average tax rate curves u1, X/Z=0.9,
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Figure B3c 
Average tax rate curves u2
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